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Child Support Enforcement Reform:
Can It Reduce the Welfare Dependency
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Among all groups of single-parent families, those created by a birth to an
unmarried woman have the least likelihood of receiving child support and
the greatest risk of becoming dependent on welfare. Wisconsin data indicate
that child support reform-specifically the immediate income assignment-is
improving child support payment performance. But the modest increases
in payments to nonmarital children will have little effect on their welfare
recipiency. The fathers of these children lack the economic resources to aid
their families much in the short term. However, cost effectiveness should not
be the only criterion used in enforcing child support. It is important to send
the message to all parent that they are expected to assume responsibility for
the children they bear.
Establishing and enforcing paternal child support obliga-
tions has become a major strategy in alleviating the welfare
dependency of single mothers and their children. Both policy-
makers and researchers agree that the lack of financial support
from the absent father forces a significant number of single
mother families to rely on the public sector for support.
Among all groups of single-parent families, the ones created
by a birth to an unmarried woman have the least likelihood of
receiving child support, and, not surprisingly, these families
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are at the greatest risk of being welfare dependent. In 1985,
less than 12% of the never-married mothers potentially eligi-
ble for child support received a child support payment, com-
pared to approximately 54% of divorced mothers. In that same
year, 22% of all single-mother families were headed by never-
married women, but they comprised over 45% of the families
on AFDC (U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1988). These data suggest
that current efforts to enforce child support in order to reduce
welfare dependency will be successful only if they reach fami-
lies of never-married mothers. Although previous research has
suggested that attempts to establish and enforce child support
obligations are less successful for never-married mothers than
for ever-married mothers (Robins, 1984), we know very little
about the outcomes or potential of recent reforms for the pop-
ulation of never-married mothers.
This paper describes trends in policies toward children born
outside of marriage, examines changes across time in one state's
paternity adjudication rates for nonmarital children and their
families, and assesses the effects of one recent child support
enforcement strategy on this state's paternity caseload. This
enforcement strategy, referred to as immediate income assign-
ment, requires that the child support obligation be withheld
from the income of the obligor immediately upon the issuance
of the child support order. Immediate assignment is currently
being implemented in several states, and under the Family Sup-
port Act of 1988 must be implemented in all states no later
than 1994. It is assumed that immediate assignment will in-
crease both the timeliness and size of child support payments
and thereby reduce the reliance of single-parent families on the
welfare system.
The paper looks first at policies and practices in the United
States toward the nonmarital child. Because public policy has
condoned, and often legalized, the notion that nonmarital chil-
dren have less right to financial assistance from their fathers
than children born within a marriage, this information is critical
for understanding what must be done to obtain child support
for this population. Of particular importance is the issue of pa-
ternity adjudication. Without a legally identified father, nonmar-
ital children are not eligible for child support. Next we describe
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the various data sources used for examining paternity adjudi-
cation trends and for analyzing the effects of immediate income
assignment on paternity cases. Then we present and discuss
our results. Using both published data and court record data
collected as part of the evaluation of the Wisconsin Child Sup-
port Reform Demonstration, we examine changes in paternity
adjudication rates, child support payment levels, and welfare
recipiency rates before and after the introduction of immediate
income assignment in Wisconsin. In the final section we discuss
the policy implications of our findings.
Nonmarital Children and Public Policy
Most contemporary observers believe that policies designed
to establish and enforce the child support obligation apply
equally to all children. This is not the case. Unlike children
born within a marriage, nonmarital children are not eligible for
child support until their paternity has been established by law.
And, historically, establishing paternity has been a significant
obstacle for children born out of wedlock. In common law, an
"illegitimate" child was considered to have no father-she/he
was viewed as the mother's child only. Although this view has
gradually changed, until the United States Supreme Court inter-
vened in a series of cases in 1968, many states denied the non-
marital child rights of paternal support, inheritance, custody,
name, and claims under such programs as Worker's Compen-
sation. On the basis of the Equal Protection Clause, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled in 1968 that nonmarital children are enti-
tled to legal equality with marital children in most areas of the
law (Krause, 1981).
The determination of paternity establishes the legal basis for
claiming a variety of rights for the nonmarital child, but it has
been used almost exclusively to obtain financial support from
the father. As early as 1922, with the passage of the Uniform
Illegitimacy Act, it was established that paternity actions could
be brought either by the mother or, if the child was likely to
be a public charge, by the authority charged with its support
(Melli, 1984). This right turned into a mandate in 1967 when the
federal government enacted legislation requiring state welfare
agencies to initiate proceedings to establish paternity for AFDC
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children who were born out of wedlock. In 1975 the federal gov-
ernment strengthened its role in this area through the passage
of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, which created the Child
Support Enforcement program. The states are responsible for
running this program, but they are reimbursed by the federal
government for about 70% of the cost of establishing paternity,
locating nonresident parents, and collecting child support. The
1975 legislation also required that program services be avail-
able to families not on welfare as well as those dependent on
AFDC. The 1984 amendments to Title IV-D further reinforced
federal commitment to child support enforcement by requiring
states to extend statutes of limitations on paternity adjudications
until the child reached the age of 18, to institute mandatory in-
come assignment when payments were in arrears, to establish
guidelines for child support awards, and to implement a vari-
ety of other provisions aimed at improving the effectiveness of
the system.
Prior to national mandates, however, several states had al-
ready enacted legislation to improve the performance of their
child support systems. Wisconsin, for example, has, since 1978,
required that income assignments be used when support pay-
ments are delinquent, and in 1983 the state legislated a uniform
standard that could be used in setting award levels. Several
states have recently established timelines to expedite paternity
determination, and some allow voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity, in lieu of a court proceeding, as a legal basis for estab-
lishing child support orders. The improved accuracy of blood
tests has also prompted a few states to allow blood results to
be used as a presumption of parentage (Loyacono, 1988).
These efforts appear to have significantly increased child
support recipiency among families of never-married mothers.
from 1981 to 1985, paternity adjudications increased by over
40% (U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1985),
and the percentage of families of never-married mothers who
received a child support award increased by almost 30% (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1983; 1989). Even with these impressive
increases, however, less than 30% of nonmarital children have
their paternity established (Danziger and Nichols-Casebolt,
1986), and only 18.4% of all never-married mothers potentially
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eligible for child support received an award in 1985. This com-
pares to almost 82% of divorced mothers with a child support
award in 1985 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1989).
One can only speculate on the reasons for the dismal per-
formance of the child support system in serving families of
never-married mothers. There is some indication that the child
support enforcement system does not view these cases as cost
effective. The burden of first having to establish paternity usu-
ally makes these cases more costly to process than divorce cases.
In addition, fathers in paternity cases are generally assumed
to be young, financial unstable, and unwilling to pay child
support, and therefore likely to result in lower awards and in-
creased enforcement costs. As a further deterrent to focusing on
nonmarital cases, state IV-D programs receive federal incentive
payments based on their total child support collections. This in-
centive plan effectively encourages states to target those cases
they believe to have the greatest potential for payments.
It is unclear to what extent recent reforms have influenced
attitudes and practices toward fathers who have not been mar-
ried to the mothers of their children. It is apparent, however,
that success in collecting child support depends on bringing
these cases into the system via the establishment of paternity,
as well as the ability to implement adequate and enforceable
child support awards.
Data
The data for determining trends in paternity adjudication
rates were obtained from three sources: (a) the number of non-
marital births compiled by the Wisconsin Division of Health;
(b) the number of paternity adjudications reported by counties
to the Wisconsin Office of Child Support; and (c) the number
of never-married families on AFDC from the Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Health and Social Services.
The data for the analysis of the effects of immediate in-
come assignments were collected as part of an evaluation of the
Wisconsin Child Support Reform Demonstration. The demon-
stration was authorized in July 1983, when the Wisconsin legis-
lature enacted a budget bill that directed the Department
of Health and Social Services (DHSS) to contract with ten of
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Wisconsin's 72 counties to withhold child support payments
from the income of all new obligors (i.e., nonresident (absent)
parents ordered to pay support in cases coming to court af-
ter the contract date). The budget bill also required DHSS to
publish a child support standard based on a percentage of the
nonresident parent's income for use by judges and family court
commissioners in establishing child support award levels. The
standard was published by DHSS in December 1983. It provides
for a child support obligation equal to 17% of the obligor's gross
income for one child, and 25, 29, 31, and 34% respectively for
two, three, four, and five or more children.
The evaluation was designed to enable both a cross-country
and a before/after comparison of the effects of immediate in-
come assignment on child support orders, payments, and wel-
fare recipiency. In addition, it allowed a before and after
comparison of the effects of the publication of the standard on
award levels. Data were obtained from a random sample of fam-
ily court divorce and paternity cases within the ten counties pi-
loting automatic income assignment and ten similar
(control) counties. The predemonstration sample included sup-
port-eligible cases that commenced with a first petition for pa-
ternity adjudication or court appearance at some point from
July 1, 1980, through June 30, 1983. The demonstration sample
extended from January 1, 1984, through September 30, 1986.1
We used a sample of 1,765 paternity cases, representing over
5,733 paternities established in the twenty counties during the
sampling period.
From the paternity court records we attempted to obtain ba-
sic demographic information-age, employment, income
amounts and sources, age of child, and the amount of the child
support order. Unfortunately, in a substantial number of the
cases, data on employment and income were not furnished in
the court record. In addition, dates and amounts of payments
were obtained from the county office of the Clerk of Courts.
(Wisconsin law mandates that child support payments be made
through the Clerk's office.)
To determine welfare recipiency rates, the paternity sample
was matched with Wisconsin AFDC records. The AFDC data
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included the amount of the AFDC payment and the number of
months of recipiency (if any) for each case in the sample.
Trends
Trends in Paternity Adjudication
Current efforts to obtain more child support for the pop-
ulation of never-married mothers depend upon increasing the
number of paternity adjudications. Enhancing award levels and
collections will have no effect on these families unless their el-
igibility for child support is first established. We assumed that
adjudications would increase as a result of the Wisconsin Child
Support Demonstration for three reasons. First, the attention
focused on collecting child support within the experimental
programs would spill over to other problems related to child
support. Second, if immediate income assignments improve col-
lections within the experimental counties, these counties would
have more resources available to devote to paternity adjudi-
cation. Finally, we assumed that when never-married moth-
ers realize that if they obtain a paternity adjudication they are
likely to receive a child support payment, they will be moti-
vated to establish the paternity of their children. Thus, income
assignments, which help assure payments, should increase the
probability that individuals will pursue the establishment of
paternity.
Unfortunately, our data do not provide us with an estimate
of changes in the paternity adjudication rate across time. To
accurately determine any increase in the adjudication rate we
would need to compare the number of paternity adjudications
in each year with the total number of nonmarital children for
whom paternity establishment was needed.2 Such a count is
not available, so we compare instead the yearly number of ad-
judications to the numbers of nonmarital births. Although the
adjudications could be for babies born in previous years, the
comparison does give us an indication of trends over time.
These data are presented in Table 1 for our experimental and
control counties. It should be noted that we have used the num-
bers of adjudications reported by each of the counties rather
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
than the counts from our court record data. Because several of
our court record cohorts do not cover an entire calendar year,
using reported adjudications is a better measure for comparison
with the yearly number of nonmarital births. However, counties
were not required to report the number of adjudications prior
to 1982.
Table 1
Trends in Nonmarital Births, Nonmarital Children on AFDC, and Numbers
of Paternity Adjudications across Years and by Experimental and Control
Counties
Ratio of
Ratio of Number of Paternity
Paternity Never- Adjudications
Number of Number of Adjudications Married to Never-
Paternity Nonmarital to Nonmarital AFDC Married AFDC
Year Adjudications Births Births Families Families
Control counties
1981 NA 1,510 NA 3,050 NA
1981 734 1,439 .51 3,295 .22
1983 889 1,455 .61 3,417 .26
1984 959 1,584 .61 3,648 .26
1985 1,058 1,754 .60 3,991 .27
1986 1,104 1,754 .63 4,142 .27
Experimental counties
1981 NA 1,118 NA 2,332 NA
1982 594 1,247 .48 2,491 .24
1983 720 1,193 .60 2,560 .28
1984 746 1,291 .58 2,796 .27
1985 835 1,457 .57 2,796 .27
1986 1,004 1,519 .66 3,242 .31
Sources: Maternal and Child Health Statistics, Wisconsin Department
of Health and Social Services, Division of Health, Madison, Wis.
County Adjudication Reports, Wisconsin Department of Health and
Social Services, Office of Child Support, Madison, Wis. AFDC Case-
load Data, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, Divi-
sion of Economic Assistance, Madison, Wis.
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Table 1 also includes data on the average monthly number
of families of never-married mothers in the AFDC caseload. The
majority of adjudications are initiated by the AFDC program.
Thus, a change in the adjudication rate might be an artifact of
a change in the numbers of nonmarital children in the AFDC
caseload. For example, if the ratio of adjudications to nonmar-
ital births increases over time while the ratio of paternity ad-
judications to the never-married AFDC population is relatively
unchanged, we might conclude that the increase in the overall
paternity adjudication ratio is a function of increased AFDC re-
cipiency among never-married mother families rather than an
increased focus on child support issues. That is, the adjudication
ratio is being driven by an increase in the likelihood of being
an AFDC recipient, not in the likelihood of having paternity
adjudicated among the recipient population.3
We can see from Table 1 that both the ratio of paternity ad-
judications to nonmarital births and the ratio of adjudications to
the number of never-married AFDC families increased between
1982 and 1986. This suggests that the paternity adjudication rate
is increasing net of the AFDC recipiency rate.
Although it was expected that after the introduction of the
demonstration in 1984, experimental counties would have
higher ratios of paternity adjudication to nonmarital births than
control counties, we do not see a substantial difference until
1986. Two explanations for the delayed effect are likely. First,
to the detriment of paternity establishment, the experimental
counties may well have initially focused their resources on the
implementation of the immediate income assignment. Second,
the number of nonmarital births increased substantially during
both 1984 and 1985, and it is likely that the paternity adju-
dication system was unprepared to accommodate these addi-
tional cases.
The 1986 ratios do suggest, however, that Wisconsin's efforts
to improve its child support system have resulted in an increase
in establishing paternity for nonmarital children, so that they
can obtain child support payments. But it is unclear to what ex-
tent the establishment of paternity will result in child support
awards, increased payments, or a reduction in welfare depen-
dency. If the increase in adjudications brings into the system
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fathers with less ability to pay child support, we may actu-
ally see a decrease in the percentage of paternity cases with
child support awards. And among those awards, average award
levels and payments may be smaller, even with recent improve-
ments in the child support system. Once paternity is adjudi-
cated, however, a legal right has been established for awarding
and collecting child support, at least until the child reaches the
age of 18. If, as seems likely, the economic situation of the absent
fathers improves in the future, we would expect the reform to
significantly improve child support award levels and payments.
Changes in Child Support Awards and Payments over Time
An examination of paternity case characteristics over time
provides some indication that the ability of fathers to pay child
support has not decreased as the number of paternity adjudi-
cations has increased. Table 2 presents case characteristics at
the time of adjudication, by cohort and by experimental and
control county. The cohorts correspond to yearly case-selection
sample periods, with the first cohort extending from July 1,
1980, through June 30, 1981, and the sixth cohort extending from
October 1, 1985, through September 30, 1986.4 The sample in-
cludes cases potentially eligible for child support from the father
during the sample period.5 All the descriptive data have been
weighted to reflect population estimates. 6
Table 2
Characteristics of Wisconsin Paternity Cases
Characteristics Predemonstration Demonstration
Cohort 1 2 3 4 5 6
1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1984 1984-85 1985-86
Control counties
Number of sample cases 126 139 133 96 141 152
Age of father 24.8 26.6 26.3 26.3 24.9 26.4
Age of mother 21.6 22.7 22.6 23.4 22.7 24.1
Age of child 1.4 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.5
Employment status
Father
Employed 45% 43% 36% 50% 49% 55%
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Unemployed 32 19 40 35 37 29
Missing info. 23 38 24 15 13 16
Mother
Employed 1 8 11 4 6 11
Unemployed 29 40 53 63 75 63
Missing info. 71 52 35 33 20 26
Average monthly income
Father $766 $814 $548 $739 $697 $1161
% with missing info. 84% 74% 77% 59% 76% 87%
Mother 458 496 509 518 527 569
% with missing info. 88% 86% 95% 51% 76% 91%
Experimental counties
Number of cases 109 151 153 80 136 140
Age of father 24.9 25.0 25.7 26.2 26.8 28.4
Age of mother 21.7 22.3 23.1 24.4 23.8 25.6
Age of child 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.6
Employment status
Father
Employed 43% 38% 40% 53% 56% 63%
Unemployed 17 34 35 41 23 24
Missing info. 41 29 25 6 21 13
Mother
Employed 5 5 9 16 8 11
Unemployed 55 66 69 73 57 65
Missing info. 41 29 22 12 36 24
Average Monthly Income
Father $752 $1154 $530 $517 $790 $782
% with missing info. 65% 55% 56% 21% 54% 53%
Mother 538 487 533 449 688 479
% with missing info. 72% 58% 54% 58% 89% 58%
Notes: Includes only those cases in which mother has legal custody
during sample period. All descriptive data are weighted to reflect pop-
ulation estimates.
The average age of the mothers, and to a lesser extent the
average age of the fathers, has been increasing over time, and
these somewhat older fathers seem to be doing better econom-
ically. Given the percentage of cases with missing information
on parental employment status, it is difficult to draw firm con-
clusions, but the available data do suggest that, on average,
fathers were more likely to be employed during the demon-
stration years. Average monthly income fluctuates considerably
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across years, but it appears that the fathers in the control coun-
ties have greater monthly income in the last year (the income
figures are in constant 1986 dollars). It is unclear whether this
increase is a function of the "aging" of the sample, an improved
economic climate in the state, or merely a bias in the data. Also,
as expected, the mothers' incomes and employment rates are
significantly lower than those of the fathers.
Table 3
Child Support Orders and Payments for Wisconsin Paternity Cases
Predemonstration Demonstration
Cohort 1 2 3 4 5 6
1980-81 1982-83 1983-84 1984 1984-85 1985-86
Control counties
Percentage of paternity
casesa with child
support order
Average monthly
amount of order
Ratio of order to
father's incomeb
Percentage of cases
with immediate income
assignment
Percentage of cases
making some payment
Ratio of payments
made to owed
Ratio of months paid
to owed
Experimental counties
Percentage of paternity
casesa with child
support order
81% 88% 59% 75% 77% 87%
$113 $115 $113 $104 $102 $107
.21 .18 .23 .16 .20
24% 9% 14% 28% 24% 47%
89% 77% 67% 89% 86% 72%
.41 .39 .45 .46 .52 .45
.42 .41 .45 .43 .50 .45
89% 90% 72% 86% 82% 80%
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Average monthly
amount of order $92 $105 $85 $98 $113 $115
Ratio of order to
father's incomeb .24 .19 .18 .16 .14 .15
Percentage of cases with
immediate income
assignment 2% 7% 4% 42% 41% 62%
Percentage of cases
making some payment 71% 76% 60% 85% 94% 79%
Ratio of payments
made to owed .36 .41 .35 .50 .58 .54
Ratio of months paid
to owed .30 .39 .35 .44 .53 .55
Notes: Includes only those cases in which mother has legal custody
during sample period.
aWeighted to reflect population estimates.
bFor fathers with reported income.
Table 3 presents information on child support orders and
payments. No clear trend is evident across cohorts in the per-
centage of cases with a child support order, and in the exper-
imental counties the average percentage of cases with awards
actually decreased from the predemonstration to the demon-
stration period. It must be remembered, however, that dur-
ing the demonstration period relatively more paternities were
established. Thus, even with a decrease in the average per-
centage of paternity cases with orders, there may have been
an increase in the percentage of all nonmarital children with
awards.We can develop a crude estimate of the potential change
in the percentage of awards for nonmarital children by using
the data in Table 1. If we assume that the ratio of paterni-
ties to nonmarital births is a proxy for trends in the adjudi-
cation rate, 7 multiplying the percentage of cases with orders
times the adjudication ratio will give us an approximation of the
change in the percentage of nonmarital children with awards.
For example, in the experimental counties, the average ratio of
paternity adjudications to nonmarital births increased by 6.7
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percentage points from the predemonstration (1982 and 1983) to
the demonstration (1984-86) period (from 53.9 to 60.6), whereas
during that same period the average percentage of paternity
cases with awards in the experimental counties decreased from
84 to 83%.8 Therefore, even though the percentage of pater-
nity cases with awards decreased during the demonstration
period, the percentage of all nonmarital children with orders
has potentially increased from 45.5% in the predemonstration
period (84% of the 53.9% with paternity adjudicated) to 50.3%
in the demonstration period (83% of the 60.6% with paternity
adjudicated).9
The increase in the rate of paternity adjudication is also a
likely explanation of why there is no clear trend in the average
order amount (in constant dollars) in the experimental counties,
and why the average order actually decreased in the control
counties during the demonstration cohorts (see Table 3). If, as
was previously discussed, more cases in which the father has
lower ability to pay have entered the system, we would ex-
pect lower orders. Interestingly, in the control counties, where
the average income of the fathers is somewhat higher in the
later years (Table 2), the average amount of the child support
orders is lower. An explanation for this seeming inconsistency
may be that in the control counties, a greater number of fathers
with missing income information have minimal income. This as-
sumption is confirmed somewhat by the relatively comparable
ratio of orders to income in the demonstration years between
the groups(Table 3). The ratio of orders to income on those cases
with available income information also suggests that the pub-
lication of the percentage-of-income standard in 1983 may be
having a negative effect on the order amount. Prior to the publi-
cation, the average award was above the 17% stipulated for one
child, whereas, postpublication, the order was more likely to be
under 17%. The most obvious trend evident in Table 3 is the
increase in immediate income assignments and the indicators
of child support payments in the experimental counties dur-
ing the demonstration period. There was considerable growth
in the percentage of cases making some payment, in the ratio
of child support payments made to payments owed, and in the
ratio of months paid to owed after the introduction of immedi-
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ate income assignment. In addition, the experimental counties
appear to do better on each of these measures than the control
counties during the demonstration period.
Use of mandatory income assignment is far from universal
in the experimental counties. Previous research on the Wiscon-
sin reform suggests that the lack of assignments is partly due
to the payer not having assignable income and partly to the un-
willingness of judges to use assignments in all cases (Garfinkel,
1986).
Two points of information will clarify the numbers of in-
come assignments in the predemonstration period and the rise
in assignments in the last cohort for the control counties. First,
prior to the implementation of the experiment, individuals
could voluntarily agree to an immediate income assignment.
One large control county, in particular, encouraged fathers to
use this type of "easy payment plan," thus accounting for the
higher rates of income assignments in the control counties dur-
ing the predemonstration period. Second, in anticipation of
statewide implementation of immediate income assignment by
January 1987, the Wisconsin legislature permitted additional
counties to begin applying immediate assignments in 1986. Sev-
eral of the control counties began using assignments in that year.
There is one apparent anomaly in the increased use of immedi-
ate assignments by control counties just prior to mandatory im-
plementation in 1987. Between the fifth and sixth cohorts, there
was a 23 percentage point increase in the use of immediate in-
come assignments in the control counties, yet, during that same
period, the ratio of payments made to owed dropped from .52
to .45. This appears to suggest that the increased use of income
assignments has a negative effect on payments. However, infor-
mation gathered in the first few months during which income
assignments were used in the experimental counties suggests
that a decrease in payment performance for counties beginning
to use immediate assignment would likely be a result of imple-
mentation lag.
Determinants of Child Support Payment Performance
These data seem to indicate that automatic income assign-
ment does have a significant effect on the payment of child
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support in paternity cases. However, the descriptive data do
not give us a clear picture of how much of the effect is at-
tributable to the use of assignments and how much might be
attributable to county or case differences. To make this assess-
ment, regression analysis was utilized. The sample includes only
those cases with a child support order during the sample period,
and the dependent variable is either the ratio of child support
paid to child support owed or the months of child support paid
to the months owed. The first dependent variable measures the
amount of payment and the second measures the consistency
of those payments. These measures are used because changes
in either will potentially affect the welfare dependency of the
mothers and children. (For further discussion of this point, see
section on effects on welfare dependency, below.) A tobit model
was used because of the relatively large number of cases with
zero dollars and months paid.' 0
In the first set of regressions (Table 4) the effect of the use
of immediate income assignment is assessed by assigning those
cases with assignments a 1 and those without assignments a
0. Other independent variables include the cohort in which the
case entered the sample (to control for potential changes over
time); the total number of months that child support payments
were owed (to control for the effects of erosion in payment over
time); the father's employment status and age at the time of the
initial court order (our best available proxies for the father's
ability to pay child support); and the county from which the
case was selected (to control for county differences). The re-
sults indicate that an immediate income assignment increases
both the relative amount of child support paid and the consis-
tency of the payment. The tobit coefficients cannot be directly
interpreted as percentages but they can be used to calculate the
expected change in the observed dependent variable (Madala,
1983). From the calculated percentages we find that, all else
being equal, the use of an immediate income assignment is ex-
pected to raise the average ratio of payments made to owed by
21.2 percentage points and the months paid to owed by 17.8
percentage points. One cannot assume from these results, how-
ever, that if all paternity cases with child support orders were
given an immediate income assignment the average payment
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ratios would increase by this amount. If there are unmeasured
characteristics of the case and/or payer that increase the like-
lihood of an income assignment being ordered and are corre-
lated with payment performance, these results will overestimate
the effects of income assignments. To control for this potential
bias, the income assignment variable was replaced by an exper-
imental county variable. Cases were given a 1 if they were in
an experimental county during the demonstration period and
a 0 if not. This variable measures the average effect on pay-
ment performance of being in an experimental county during
the demonstration years, regardless of each individual case's
likelihood of having an immediate assignment. Table 5 presents
the results of this analysis.
Table 4
Tobit Analysis of Effects of Immediate Income Assignment on Child Support
Payment Measures for Paternity Caseload
Independent Variables Dollars/Paid Months Paid/
Dollars Owed Months Owed
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Income assignment 18.67*** 4.92 18.99** 4.31
Cohort 2 - .52 6.68 - 4.26 5.76
Cohort 3 - 8.98 8.24 - 12.82 6.84
Cohort 4 7.77 6.74 4.39 6.21
Cohort 5 12.41 6.91 6.83 6.00
Cohort 6 - 10.41 8.69 - 15.01* 7.18
Months CS owed - .44 .29 - .86*** .23
Father's empl. status
Employed 21.8*** 4.25 20.94*** 3.65
Missing info. 3.34 5.12 5.91 4.42
Father's age
20 - - 29 1.26 4.89 3.41 4.36
30 - - 39 2.64 6.05 2.76 5.35
40+ 14.05 8.01 11.76 6.79
Missing info. 19.57 12.42 18.60 10.65
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County
Calumet 29.06** 11.41 24.84** 9.71
Clark 29.4** 10.38 15.15 10.17
Dane 8.10 6.77 8.46 5.67
Dodge 2.21 8.89 3.15 7.57
Dunn - 8.89 10.74 - 14.05 9.82
Green - 5.55 9.10 1.85 7.10
Jefferson 12.00 9.42 12.70 8.11
Juneau 8.65 10.93 5.92 9.05
Kewaunee 2.87 13.10 2.34 11.97
Marathon 25.35** 8.67 14.90* 7.76
Monroe 12.10 9.67 - 4.44 9.51
Oneida - 4.33 8.74 - 7.49 7.81
Ozaukee 3.21 8.13 - .37 7.20
Price 15.89 11.29 9.91 10.05
Racine .17 7.33 6.90 5.86
Richland - 25.88** 10.40 - 25.68** 8.83
Sheboygan 12.87 7.67 9.92 6.67
St. Croix 7.68 9.07 - .06 8.16
Winnebago - 3.41 6.61 - 5.84 5.93
Constant 25.91* 10.96 34.65*** 9.06
Sigma 51.27*** 1.56 44.86*** 1.27
Mean of dep. var. 45.32 42.74
N = 1191
Log Likelihood - 4589.0 - 4722.7
*p < .05.**p < .01.***p < .001.
Table 5
Tobit Analysis of Effects of Experimental County Status on Child Support
Payment Measures
Independent Variables Dollars/Paid Months Paid/
Dollars Owed Months Owed
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Experimental county 12.83* 6.45 12.98* 5.65
.40 6.73 - 3.34Cohort 2
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Cohort 3 - 7.93 8.28 - 11.62 6.91
Cohort 4 5.20 7.43 2.19 6.72
Cohort 5 11.19 7.53 5.83 6.44
Cohort 6 - 7.10 8.92 - 11.33 7.43
Months CS owed - .37 .29 - .79*** .23
Father's empl. status
Employed 26.34*** 4.10 25.52*** 3.53
Missing info. 3.93 5.17 6.78 4.47
Father's age
20-29 1.17 4.93 3.39 4.45
30-39 2.98 6.08 3.23 5.43
40+ 13.00 7.92 11.10 6.83
Missing info. 18.31 12.61 17.85 10.94
County
Calumet 29.89** 11.49 25.62 9.77
Clark 27.78** 10.62 13.88 10.28
Dane 2.75 7.54 2.98 6.35
Dodge 1.95 8.91 2.83 7.69
Dunn - 12.58 11.41 - 18.28 10.48
Green - 5.02 9.22 2.44 7.25
Jefferson 12.17 9.37 12.80 8.09
Juneau 12.50 10.89 9.73 9.10
Kewaunee 1.64 13.91 .83 13.10
Marathon 25.08** 8.58 14.48 7.70
Monroe 13.37 10.37 - 3.47 9.96
Oneida - 8.76 9.27 - 12.11 8.23
Ozaukee - .86 8.57 - 4.51 7.58
Price 14.94 11.42 8.80 10.24
Racine 3.37 7.28 9.99 5.87
Richland - 28.44** 10.82 - 28.38** 9.20
Sheboygan 10.02 8.25 7.08 7.11
St. Croix 5.21 9.13 - 2.86 8.26
Winnebago - 6.83 7.39 - 9.33 6.56
Constant 24.55* 11.11 32.96*** 9.21
Sigma 51.58*** 1.58 45.28*** 1.28
Mean of dep. var. 45.32 42.74
N = 1191
Log likelihood - 4595.5 - 4731.7
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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We can see that being an experimental county increases both
dependent variables. These coefficients, however, are neither as
large nor as statistically significant as the income assignment
coefficient presented in Table 4. Again, estimating the percent-
age change from the tobit coefficients indicates that being in an
experimental county increases the ratio of dollars paid to owed
by 14.3 percentage points and the months paid to owed by 15.5
percentage points. It must be remembered, however, that some
of the control counties also increased their use of immediate in-
come assignments during the later years. Thus the experimental
county coefficients are likely to be an underestimate of the ef-
fects of the implementation of income assignments. Therefore,
the true effect of immediate income assignments on payment
performance in paternity cases probably lies somewhere be-
tween the two estimates of 21 and 14% for dollars paid to owed,
and 18 and 15% for months paid to owed. That is, the use of
immediate income assignment raises the average of payments
paid to owed from .45 to between .59 and .66, and months paid
to owed from .43 to between .58 and .61.
In both sets of equations, these effects are estimated after
controlling for a variety of other variables. An examination of
the other coefficients indicates that fathers who are employed
have significantly higher payment ratios. In fact, employment
has a greater effect on payment performance than the use of
immediate income assignments. Given that in our sample of
paternity cases less than 50% were employed, it is not surprising
that average payment performance is relatively poor.
Effects on Welfare Dependency
The major impetus for public policy intervention within the
private child support system is to reduce the welfare depen-
dency of single-mother families. Although our data suggest that
income assignments in Wisconsin have increased the payment
of child support and the consistency of payments for those who
have had the paternity of their children established, we do not
know if this translates into decreased welfare dependency for
these families. To assess the effects of immediate income assign-
ments on welfare dependency, each paternity case with a child
support order was matched, using social security numbers, to
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Wisconsin AFDC records." With the AFDC record match we
were able to determine the number of months of recipiency (if
any) for each case in the sample and the amount of the AFDC
payment.
Table 6 presents descriptive data on trends in AFDC recip-
iency for our sample of paternity cases with others. The per-
centage of cases on AFDC at the time of the initial petition to
establish paternity, and the percentage on AFDC after the re-
ceipt of a child support award do not show any clear trends
over time. The data do indicate that, on average, between 75
and 80% of all paternity cases with child support orders are
AFDC recipients when the process of paternity adjudication is
started. This suggests that the welfare system is instrumental
in the establishment of paternity for nonmarital children. The
noticeable exception to these high percentages is during cohort
1, and to some extent during cohort 2. Unfortunately, our data
do not provide us with any explanation for the lower percent-
ages in these cohorts. In addition, it is clear from these data that
being on AFDC when petitioning for a paternity adjudication
increases the likelihood that the case will receive an immedi-
ate income assignment if it is in an experimental county during
the demonstration period. This implies that the welfare system
may not only be instrumental in the adjudication of paternity,
but also in assuring that the income assignment reform is im-
plemented for individuals receiving welfare.
Table 6
AFDC Recipiency among Wisconsin Paternity Cases with Child Support
Orders
Predemonstration Demonstration
Cohort 1 2 3 4 5 6
Control counties
Number of cases
with orders 80 112 73 65 108 118
Percentage on AFDC
at time of petition
to establish paternity 53% 62% 79% 88% 78% 76%
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Percentage with immediate
income assignment
Cases on AFDC
at petition
Cases not on AFDC
at petition
Percentage ever on
AFDC after child
support award
Ratio of months
on AFDC to months
owed child support
Average net monthly
AFDC benefit
16% 13% 13% 31% 21% 50%
31% 1% 23% 14% 32% 38%
86% 78% 73% 87% 88% 82%
.66 .64 .70 .64 .71 .77
$287 $318 $328 $321 $362 $410
Experimental counties
Number of cases
with orders
Percentage on AFDC
at time of petition
to establish paternity
Percentage with immediate
income assignment
Cases on AFDC
at petition
Cases not on AFDC
at petition
Percentage ever on
AFDC after child
support award
Ratio of months
on AFDC to months
owed child support
Average net monthly
AFDC benefit
71 126 116 69 104 97
57% 72% 80% 78% 70% 72%
2% 8% 2% 46% 45% 63%
0% 1% 12% 25% 33% 61%
61% 87% 86% 90% 86% 80%
.44 .77 .77 .71 .74 .72
$218 $372 $354 $358 $355 $333
Note: Sample sizes vary because of missing data on social security
numbers or AFDC benefit amounts.
Child Support Enforcement Reform
In most instances the percentage of cases ever on AFDC after
a child support award has been established exceeds the percent-
age on at the time of the petition for adjudication. Obviously
the greater length of time increases the likelihood of recipiency.
When the percentage is lower, for example in the control coun-
ties during cohort 3, it indicates that some of the cases which
were on AFDC at the time they petitioned for an adjudication
exited before they received child support orders. While there
is not a clear trend in the percentage ever on AFDC after the
receipt of an award, the data do indicate that (excluding co-
hort 1) mothers were less likely to be dependent on AFDC in
the experimental counties after the demonstration started. This
may be an indication that the income assignment reform, and
its concomitant increase in child support payments, is reducing
the need for AFDC.
More accurate measures of AFDC dependency, however, are
the ratio of months on AFDC to months eligible for a child sup-
port payment (i.e., after an award), and the average net monthly
AFDC benefit received during the months the case was eligible
for a child support payment. The first measure captures the
changes in the percentage of cases with awards that are ever on
AFDC as well as changes in the average number of months on
AFDC. The second measure is an average of the monthly AFDC
benefit minus any child support received that month. Cases not
on AFDC in a given month are assigned a $0 net benefit. From
these two measures we can determine if, on average, nonmarital
children with child support orders in our sample are spending
proportionately more or less time on AFDC, and if, on average,
more or less dollars are being expended each month on benefits
to these children and their families.
Although it is anticipated that assignments will lead to re-
ductions in AFDC benefits and months receiving benefits during
the demonstration period, this may not be the case. If, as in Ta-
ble 3 may indicate, the average award amount decreases during
the demonstration period, an increase in the percentage of child
support paid may not result in an increase in the average dol-
lars of child support received, and thus the net AFDC benefit
will not decrease. Furthermore, an increase in consistency of the
child support payment may not decrease the number of months
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an individual receives AFDC. For example, if the average gross
AFDC benefit is $100 per month, the average child support pay-
ment is $50 a month, and the ratio of months paid to owed is
100 percent, the case will continue to receive AFDC each month.
From the descriptive data in Table 6, it appears that in the
control counties the average paternity case spends more time
on AFDC and receives more in net benefits during the demon-
stration period than in the predemonstration period. However,
in the experimental counties (if we exclude cohort 1) both time
on AFDC and average monthly benefits decreased somewhat
after the demonstration began. The income assignment may,
therefore, be having an effect on welfare dependency.
We used regression analysis to determine if income assign-
ments, rather than other factors, are influencing our measures
of welfare dependency. Tobit estimation was again used to take
into account the percentage of cases that receive no AFDC. The
dependent variable is either the ratio of months on AFDC to
months eligible for a child support payment, or the average net
monthly AFDC benefit during the months eligible for a child
support payment.12 As in the previous regressions, separate
models were run using experimental county and income assign-
ment as the independent variables of interest. Also included in
the model are variables to control for case and county charac-
teristics that may affect either AFDC recipiency or child support
payment. These variables are the cohort, the number of months
child support payments are owed, the county, the father's and
the mother's employment status at the time of the initial court
order, the age of the child,13 and the age of the mother.14 To
control for the possible confounding effects of changes in the
amount of the child support award over time, and the strong
correlation between being an AFDC recipient at the time of the
paternity petition and having an income assignment, the order
amount and whether or not a case was on AFDC at the time of
petition were also included as independent variables.
Table 7 presents the coefficients and standard errors on the
experimental county and income assignment variables. (An ex-
ample of the full regression is included in the Appendix.) The
only significant coefficient is the effect of living in an experimen-
tal county on the percentage of time on AFDC. Interestingly,
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the coefficient is positive, which suggests that being in an ex-
perimental county during the demonstration period increases,
rather than decreases, the percentage of time on AFDC. The
size and strength of this coefficient makes our result suspect.
It is likely that this model is not adequately controlling for the
fact that being on AFDC at the time of the petition increases
the likelihood that a case will be given an income assignment-
particularly in the experimental counties. The data presented
in Table 6 suggest that not only does having an income assign-
ment affect AFDC recipiency, but that AFDC recipients are more
likely than others to have an income assignment. Unfortunately,
assessing the effect of income assignments on our measures of
AFDC dependency, net of the effect of AFDC on income as-
signment, is beyond the scope of this paper. We can, however,
examine the effects of income assignments for all cases on AFDC
at the time they petition for a paternity adjudication. These re-
sults are presented in Table 8.
Table 7
Effects of Living in Experimental County and Having Immediate Income As-
signment on AFDC Dependency Measures, for All Cases with Child Support
Orders
Independent Variables Percentage of Sample Average Monthly/
Time of AFDC AFDC Payment
N = 1,191 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Experimental county 20.77* 10.25 - 8.65 37.18
Income assignment 4.04 7.08 - 1.28 25.80
Although the coefficient for experimental county is still pos-
itive, it and all of the other coefficients are not statistically sig-
nificant. Evidently neither being in an experimental county nor
having an income assignment has any effect on our measures
of the welfare dependency of individuals who were on AFDC
at the time of their petition for a paternity judgment.
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Table 8
Effects of Living in Experimental County and Having Immediate Income
Assignment on AFDC Dependency Measures, for Cases on AFDC at Petition
Date
Independent Variables Percentage of Sample Average Monthly/
Time of AFDC AFDC Payment
N = 908 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Experimental county 7.01* 10.23 - 50.24 41.16
Income assignment - .69 7.17 - 11.59 28.31
Conclusions
Our conclusions paint a relatively pessimistic picture about
the ability of current reforms in the enforcement of the child
support obligation to reduce welfare dependency among the
paternity caseload. Although our analyses confirm that a re-
form such as automatic income assignment can increase child
support payments for this group, the results indicate that the
average percentage of child support paid is still only two-thirds
of what is owed. And given the fact that the average child sup-
port award for our sample was less than $115 per month, it is
not surprising that there were no significant effects of income
assignment on our measure of welfare dependency.
On the other hand, our data suggest that we are having
some success in increasing paternity adjudication and bring-
ing a greater percentage of nonmarital children into the child
support system. Thus, while income assignments are related
to rather modest increases in payment levels, proportionately
more nonmarital children are receiving those payments. And
although our data do not allow us to measure changes in wel-
fare dependency among all nonmarital children, it is likely that
a proportionately greater number are less dependent upon the
welfare system because they receive some child support.
These results support the position that we must focus our
attention on adjudicating paternity as well as enforcing child
support obligations for this population. However, if the current
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paternity caseload is at all representative of nonmarital children
who have not had paternity established, expecting the child
support system to solve the problem of welfare dependency and
poverty among families of never-married mothers is unrealistic.
Because the fathers of these children lack economic resources, it
is unlikely that they will pay sufficient amounts of child support
to adequately support their children, at least in the short term.
These findings argue for additional strategies to improve the
economic well-being of nonmarital children and their mothers.
Unfortunately, they may also reinforce the attitude of many in
the child support system that directing attention to the nonmar-
ital child is not cost effective. What is often forgotten, however,
is that enforcing the child support obligation is more than a
mechanism for obtaining adequate financial support for chil-
dren and reducing welfare caseloads. It also establishes a legal
basis for the nonmarital child to claim the same paternal rights
as the marital child. And maybe even more importantly, it is
a message to parents that, as a society, we expect both parents
to assume responsibility for their children. To allow a father to
abrogate that responsibility because his child was born outside
of a marriage is not only inequitable, it is poor public policy.
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Notes
1. Data from the baseline sample were followed until June 30, 1984.
Thus, each case has a minimum of 12 months of data, and a maximum
of 36 months. The demonstration cases were followed until January
31, 1987, again giving us a minimum of 12 months and a maximum
of 36 months of data.
2. Paternity establishment is only needed for those children who are not
adopted or whose parents do not marry. Although we refer through-
out this paper to "never-married" mothers as requiring a paternity
adjudication, married mothers may also require an adjudication if
the person they marry is not the father of their children and does not
choose to adopt them.
3. A numerical example may help clarify this point. Assume that in one
year there were 100 nonmarital births, 200 nonmarital children on
AFDC, and 20 paternity adjudications. The ratio of adjudications to
all births is .20 and the ratio of adjudications to nonmarital AFDC
children is .10. If in the next year there were again 100 nonmarital
births, but the number of nonmarital children on AFDC increased to
225 and the number of paternity adjudications increased to 25. The
ratio of adjudications to all births has now increased to .25, however
the ratio to AFDC children has only increased to .11. Because most
paternities are initiated by the AFDC system we would conclude from
this example that the majority of the increase in the overall ratio is due
to an increased likelihood that a nonmarital child will be on AFDC,
but once on AFDC, his/her likelihood of having paternity adjudicated
has not improved much from the previous year.
4. Cohort 1 contains a sample of all cases that entered the court system
from July 1, 1980, through June 30, 1981. The time frame for the other
cohorts is as follows: Cohort 2, July 1, 1981, through June 30, 1982;
Cohort 3, July 1, 1982, through june 30, 1983; Cohort 4, January 1,
1984, through October 1, 1984; Cohort 5, October 1, 1984, through
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September 30, 1985; and Cohort 6, October 1, 1985, through September
20, 1986.
5. Cases in which the mother was not the legal custodian of the child
were excluded. Also excluded were cases in which the petition date
fell within our sampling period but the date of paternity adjudication,
and thus eligibility for a child support order, occurred after the end of
the sampling period. The exclusion of these cases reduced the sample
from 1,765 cases to 1,556 cases.
6. Weighting is done to obtain population estimates from the sample.
Each case is assigned a weighting factor. This weighting factor is a
ratio of the total number of paternity adjudications filed in the county
from which the case was selected during the year the case entered the
sample, to the number of paternities in our sample in that county and
year. For example, a sample case weight of 3 means that each case in
our sample represents 3 cases in the population of paternity cases for
that county and sample year.
7. As noted previously, these ratios are not an accurate measure of the
adjudication rate. They are only to be used as an approximation of
the trends over time.
8. The average adjudication ratios were calculated by dividing the total
number of paternities adjudicated in the period by the total num-
ber of nonmarital births during the same period. For example, in the
experimental counties during the predemonstration period (1982-83)
there were 1,314 adjudications (594 + 720) and 2,440 births (1,247 +
1,193), giving a ratio of .539 or 53.9 percent. Thus, 53.9 percent of all
nonmarital children have paternity adjudicated and are potentially
eligible for a child support award During the demonstration period,
60.6 percent of all nonmarital chiL.ren had paternity adjudicated-an
increase of 6.7 percentage points from the predemonstration period.
The percentage of paternity cases with awards during the period is
just the average of the yearly percentages. For example, in the ex-
perimental counties during the predemonstration period the average
percentage is (.89 + .90 + .72)/3, or 84 percent. The comparable per-
centage during the demonstration period was 83 percent.
9. The same holds true in the control counties, where the percentage of
nonmarital children with predemonstration orders was 42.6 and with
demonstration orders, was 49.
10. For this analysis a two-limit tobit was used because the pay-to-owe
ratios (multiplied by 100) were restricted to between 0 and 100. The
two-limit tobit takes into account that the observed variable cannot
be less than 0 or greater than 100, by simultaneously estimating the
probability of observing a value of 0 or 100. The coefficients measure
how the unrestricted (latent) dependent variable would change with
changes in the explanatory variables.
11. Approximately 4 percent of the court record sample (51 cases) were
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missing social security numbers and thus had to be omitted from this
analysis.
12. Two-limit tobits are used for the proportion of time on AFDC because
this variable is observed only between 0 and 100. However, the net
AFDC benefit does not have a fixed upper limit, so the regressions
are run using a tobit with a single limit at 0.
13. The child for whom paternity has been established. Although the ages
and number of other children in the family would be an appropriate
variable to include in our regressions, we do not have this information
in our court record data.
14. Father's age was not used because it was not a significant predic-
tor in the payment regressions and because of the strong correlation
between mother's and father's age.
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Appendix Table A.1
Tobit Regression of Effects of Living in Experimental County on AFDC
Dependency Measures
Independent Variables Percentage of Sample Average Monthly
Time on AFDC AFDC Payment
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Experimental county
Cohort 2
Cohort 3
Cohort 4
Cohort 5
Cohort 6
Months CS owed
CS order amount
On AFDC at time
of petition to
establish paternity
Father's employment
status
Employed
Missing info.
Mother's employment
status
Employed
Missing info.
Mother's age
20-29
30-39
40+
Missing info.
Age of child
County
Calumet
Clark
Dane
20.77
17.88
11.13
- 4.75
12.29
15.56
- 1.04*
10.25
10.40
13.46
11.23
11.25
13.72
.45
- .15** .04
113.55*** 6.06
- .55 6.56
- 1.07 8.35
- 16.90** 6.30
- 14.33 13.13
- 2.27
2.63
44.01
- 53.75***
- 4.53**
11.72
- 11.23
2.24
5.77
11.06
32.57
9.16
1.54
12.83
18.29
12.02
- 8.65
16.16
- 72.74
42.93
36.03
- 10.15
5.99***
37.18
38.85
49.22
42.37
41.67
49.23
1.62
- .38
346.89*** 19.70
- 55.82* 22.64
- 46.70 30.24
- 21.63 21.96
- 34.54 46.13
5.89
103.54***
117.03
- 198.64***
- 16.50**
- 50.84
- 64.05
- 17.07
21.73
28.57
137.00
36.90
5.59
51.05
66.65
44.01
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Dodge - .16 13.10 - 32.06 48.87
Dunn - 25.79 17.67 - 42.70 68.26
Green 9.61 14.53 - 20.22 52.72
Jefferson - 16.44 13.52 - 88.91 50.88
Juneau - 16.62 18.22 - 76.37 62.59
Kewaunee - 35.69 21.70 - 91.44 68.21
Marathon 7.24 11.87 - 59.26 46.77
Monroe - 13.50 15.29 - 73.48 60.10
Oneida - 19.99 18.28 - 23.64 56.69
Ozaukee - 14.19 12.79 - 65.42 49.91
Price 25.40 18.44 - 82.54 85.61
Racine 20.53* 10.83 36.00 35.15
Richland - 5.54 17.05 18.78 54.58
Sheboygan - 1.87 12.84 - 57.55 46.48
St. Croix - 5.92 17.12 11.74 48.01
Winnebago - 10.52 13.26 - 32.67 42.63
Constant 43.35** 16.71 268.34*** 61.22
Sigma 70.02*** 2.93 251.02*** 3.66
Mean of Dep. Var. 64.52 289.27
N = 1191
Log Likelihood - 2888.7 - 6685.0
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
